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Countries’ increases in testing capacity during the first waves of the
COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with reductions in case numbers
between waves, have resulted in shifts from diagnostic testing of
symptomatic patients to mass screening. Viewed from the perspective
of United Kingdom testing, it is therefore arguable that the largest
asymptomatic testing programme, by testing rate, ever attempted in
the country is currently being deployed. Other countries are deploying
similar programmes. Even with the advent of further waves of infec-
tion, especially associated with northern hemisphere winter, asymp-
tomatic testing is still occurring, and it can be anticipated that as
waves recede and seasons change it will again increase. These shifts
have led to policies that risk conflating diagnosis with screening.
Currently, there are local, regional and national variations in crite-
ria for screening, in modes of delivery, in whether laboratories under-
take confirmatory testing following positive screen results, in the
extents of contact tracing undertaken, and in quality assurance of* Corresponding author at: Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical
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icy objectives of the screening being undertaken. Unavoidably, varia-
tions within the populations being tested, in terms of both disease
prevalence (and hence the proportion of positive tests that are false
positives) and the level of risk to the health of different individuals,
also lead to implications for testing strategies, acceptability, and bal-
ancing the interests of individuals and society.
Screening for SARS-CoV-2 is being undertaken with heteroge-
neous inclusion criteria and with heterogeneous aims [1]. The UK
government’s early policy stated a primary aim of making diagnoses
in symptomatic individuals, with the main aim of the testing strategy
being to send back to work high risk critical workers in whom a diag-
nosis of COVID-19 was not made [2]. However, this was rapidly
extended to testing people without symptoms in care homes or
returning from hospital to care homes [3,4]. More recently, there are
reports of government plans to increase UK SARS-CoV-2 testing
capacity to 10 million tests per day  sufficient to test the entire pop-
ulation each week  with these plans mentioning both symptomatic
individuals and their contacts [5]. Individual organisations have used
increased testing capacity to test people without symptoms with the
aim of reducing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 [6,7]. Asymptomatic
screening has been adopted in hospital settings to guide both infec-
tion control practices around those with higher risk of being infec-
tious and timings of treatment for other conditions (such as elective
surgery and cancer chemotherapy) where there may be a higher risk
of adverse outcomes if infected [811]. It has been adopted in com-
munity settings to allow rapid isolation and cohorting of infectious
individuals in facilities and hence to reduce morbidity and mortality
from institutional outbreaks [1214]. It has even been used to moni-
tor the progress and guide timing of containment measures for an
entire town [15]. Wider screening of healthcare workers [16] and
university students and staff [17] has been advocated.
Testing strategies are being managed in a piecemeal fashion, but
from a historical perspective this mirrors the introduction of many
mass screening programmes. Heterogeneity within and betweenr the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
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in historical cases when other screening was introduced in uncoordi-
nated fashion, with the practice of screening ahead of evidence for its
benefit, we now need to develop a systematic approach and ask to
what ends we are screening, whether screening achieves these ends,
and how we can approach screening methodically, in order that we
can efficiently and economically achieve the best outcomes feasible
as circumstances in the pandemic change. These are the purposes for
which many countries have screening oversight organisations.2. Not all positive tests reflect infection
Most tests for SARS-CoV-2 infection were developed and evaluated
in the context of people with symptoms (i.e. to diagnose disease),
whereas many of those now being tested are asymptomatic. Although
a clinically significant proportion of those with infection have no
symptoms (with estimates varying from under 50% to around 75%)
[15,20,21], nevertheless the proportion of the entire asymptomatic
general population with infection will be much smaller than the pro-
portion of the symptomatic population with infection. Further, the
absence of symptoms suggests different within-host viral dynamics
and immune response, meaning it is not possible to extrapolate reli-
ably from a test’s performance in symptomatic individuals to ascertain
a performance in asymptomatic individuals. It is difficult to evaluate a
test’s sensitivity (how well the test correctly identifies those with
infection) in those without symptoms especially in those who never
develop symptoms  because there is no gold standard against which
to compare. If (as suggested in the United Kingdom strategy) a test is
used to move people from being isolated back into a situation where
they may infect others, then sensitivity is important  and with an
estimated test sensitivity around 70% [22], it appears prima facie that
current test sensitivities may make this strategy risky; however, as
sensitivity will correlate with degree of viral shedding and therefore
infectivity, this theoretical risk is reduced in practice. (Sensitivity esti-
mates in the literature are highly variable [2325], measures are
sometimes used to detect false negative results caused by inadequate
sampling [26], and new tests with different performance characteris-
tics are being introduced [27,28], meaning the interactions between
test sensitivity and public health response need to be re-evaluated for
each test whose deployment is considered.) Nevertheless, when a test
is being used to identify and isolate asymptomatic infectious individu-
als who would otherwise have been free to infect others, any sensitiv-
ity that results in a clinically significant reduction in disease spread is
useful (and a small percentage reduction in disease spread may be
sufficient in populations where the virus effective reproduction num-
ber Reff is just above 1). In many ways, therefore, the test’s specificity
(how well the test correctly excludes those without infection) matters
more in largely-asymptomatic populations: when the prevalence of
infection is low, even a highly specific test results in many of the posi-
tive results perhaps even themajority coming from those without
infection (false positives), reflecting the preponderance of individuals
in that population without infection. Just as with sensitivity, the lack
of gold standard makes quantifying the specificity of a SARS-CoV-2
diagnostic test difficult, but we have shown that when the prevalence
of infection is low it is possible to make reliable estimates [29]. The
issue of positive tests in those without infection becomes prominent
for any test when population prevalence is sufficiently low, but with
realistic estimates of a test sensitivity of 70% [22] (note that most of
the loss of sensitivity comes at time of sampling, not during laboratory
testing) and a test specificity of 99.95% [29], it is probable that during
the summer of 2020, the United Kingdom reached a point where
reported SARS-CoV-2 positivity rates mostly represented
false positive tests, with week-to-week variations largely representing
natural fluctuations in false positive rates (Fig. 1).3. What do we do when people have positive tests?
In a screening programme, usually the next step after the initial
screening test is to conduct confirmatory testing for those with posi-
tive tests. Nucleic acid amplification testing is highly specific, but
even this high specificity is insufficient when used at high throughput
in groups with a low prevalence of infection (Fig. 1). Steps that virolo-
gists usually deploy to improve single test specificity, such as expert
review of results, do not apply to some of the new amplification tech-
nologies in use, do not scale to the number of tests currently being
undertaken, and still do not help in some difficult cases and some
uncommon modes of error occasionally seen at high throughput
(such as transposing labels on samples or contamination of a sample
with positive control material). As a result, confirmatory testing is
advisable, and we have therefore begun to deploy confirmatory test-
ing in England [32]. With SARS-CoV-2 testing, such confirmation is
most likely to involve repeating the original test, or running it on a
different testing platform (an approach similar to that taken in exist-
ing screening programmes such as antenatal HIV serological testing).
In the case of SARS-CoV-2 infection, the short time during which
infection is asymptomatic but infectious to others (whether pre-
symptomatic, or in those who never develop symptoms) means there
is a trade-off between accuracy and timeliness not seen in other
screening programmes. Undertaking confirmatory testing of positive
screens decreases the chance of an overall positive test in a person
without infection, but the additional turnaround time required for
confirmatory testing covers the period in which the highest benefit
from isolating the person may be obtained [33]. The obvious answer
to this issue is to request that those positive on initial screens isolate
whilst confirmatory testing is undertaken. Implementing such a pro-
tocol requires a high level of understanding of the risks being man-
aged amongst those tested and those advising on actions to be taken:
experience has shown that full compliance with self-isolation
instructions already occurs in only a minority [34]. The increased use
of confirmatory testing for SARS-CoV-2 will be accompanied by an
urgent need for professional education of non-specialists, particularly
focussed on safeguarding those awaiting confirmatory testing from
inadvertent infection, on clearly explaining processes so as to main-
tain public trust, and on having the courage to de-escalate those
whose positive screening tests are not confirmed.
This leads us to fundamental issues that go beyond the analytical
performance of a test and the factors affecting that analytical perfor-
mance. When a test is used for screening, as opposed to diagnosis,
several other considerations come into effect, apart from the simple
one of whether the screening test has managed to reach a correct
diagnosis. Chiefly, we need strategies for managing people with posi-
tive test results  including those with positive screening tests await-
ing confirmation. Such strategies need to maximise benefits from
reducing infectiousness, whilst minimising the varied harms that can
result from a positive test. Screening will only yield benefit if, in
addition to infectious individuals, some non-infectious individuals
are asked to isolate, and careful analysis and good communication of
such strategy options and their alternatives is ethically and practi-
cally necessary to ensure a net benefit from screening and retain
public confidence in the pandemic response.
4. Benefits, harms, and dilemmas
In the community (including the setting of healthcare staff screen-
ing), there is a need to consider whether it is acceptable to have a sit-
uation where people will be required to isolate, either whilst
awaiting confirmatory testing, or (if there is insufficient capacity
for confirmatory testing) for the entire duration of potential infec-
tiousness, with the possibility of no benefit to anybody because they
are not in fact infected. Such isolation may entail inconvenience, psy-
chological distress, disruption of family life, loss of earnings, and
Fig. 1. Pictogram representing outcomes of screening 100,000 people in (upper panel) higher prevalence setting (UK Office for National Statistics estimate of 1.33% test positivity in
healthcare workers during period 27th April10th May 2020 [30]) and (lower panel) lower prevalence setting (UK Office for National Statistics estimate of 0.052% test positivity in
community during period 14th27th June 2020 [31]), with sensitivity 70%, specificity 99.95%. To the left of each panel is an expanded view showing all true positive, false positive,
and false negative results. Small rectangles represent 100 people, and medium rectangles represent 5000 people. In the top panel there are 1830 people with disease, of whom
1281 test positive (true positive) and 549 test negative (false negative), and 98,170 people without disease, of whom 49 test positive (false positive) and 98,121 test negative (true
negative). The number needed to isolate to remove one infectious individual is 1.04. In the bottom panel there are 3 people with disease, of whom 2 test positive (true positive) and
1 tests negative (false negative), and 99,997 people without disease, of whom 50 test positive (false positive) and 99,947 test negative (true negative). The number needed to isolate
to remove one infectious individual is 25.98. Note that using these data to generate full prevalence estimates with confidence intervals would require knowing the variability in sen-
sitivity, which is difficult to determine.
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medical professionals, in a relatively secure socioeconomic position,
not to overlook the reality that some people being asked to isolate
need to balance their perception of the risk from COVID-19 with a
risk that isolation will involve a loss of job, and consequently possiblyeven housing and the ability to afford to feed themselves and their
families. Disengagement from screening or follow-up is not a prob-
lem unique to SARS-CoV-2 screening, and in addressing it there are
lessons to be learned from studies of those who do not attend screen-
ing or follow-up in other programmes, such as normalising
4 J.P. Skittrall et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Europe 1 (2021) 100002discussions about screening within social groups, addressing individ-
ual fatalism about infection, addressing negative perceptions of the
particular programme, sending reminders, simplifying the testing
experience, providing help to mitigate the short-term drawbacks of
screening and emphasising the long-term benefits [3538]. In the
hospital or care setting, an individual with a positive screen but not
infected may be placed at greater risk of nosocomial infection if
cohorted with others with or at higher risk of infection, or may miss
out on essential procedures that are delayed because of potential
infectiousness. In the care setting, isolation or cohorting may involve
removing a person from his or her usual place of residence.
The best way to manage positive tests may also depend upon the
prevalence of disease. Regardless of disease prevalence, most of the
potential harm to an individual (from isolation and its consequences
or from delayed access to other healthcare) remains the same. How-
ever, the expected benefit changes depending upon disease preva-
lence: when there are many people with disease, then the chances of
somebody with a positive screen having infection are higher, so the
expected benefit to the individual and to others if the person is man-
aged as infected is higher, so this management is more justifiable.
Conversely, when there are few people with disease, and so a person
with a positive screen has a relatively low chance of being infected,
the expected benefit from managing the individual as infected is
lower, the benefit may be outweighed by the risks, and it is harder to
justify risking harm to that individual in order to protect others. The
major exception to this paradigm is where a region is pursuing an
elimination strategy, and so the expected benefits from avoiding sin-
gle infections in a low prevalence setting are higher, and hence may
still outweigh the risks of managing individuals as infected. As a
result, it is important for those making public health and infection
control decisions to make the distinction, ethically and practically,
between measures intended to keep disease prevalence low and
measures intended to eliminate disease altogether.
In all these settings there is a practical and ethical dilemma in that
everybody’s overall risk of harm is reduced if enough people are will-
ing to be tested and isolated if the test is positive, but each person
who undergoes testing incurs a small risk of harm to themselves
from a positive test. People’s responses to screening invitations will
depend upon their understanding of and attitude to the test itself
[3538]. Their responses may be impacted by others’ uptake of test-
ing and behaviour relating to possible infection, because the behav-
iour of others may impact upon perceived societal obligation [39].
Their willingness to isolate may be affected by social and economic
factors [40,41], and the possibility of modifying these factors (such as
undertaken in the United Kingdom by introducing a payment to
some on low incomes who are asked to isolate [42]) and the details
of how raise behavioural, economic, political, and ethical questions
that cannot be detached and considered separately from the proper-
ties of tests being undertaken. Different individuals will accept differ-
ent thresholds of risk (e.g. a healthcare worker facing being sent
home on full pay from a ward full of vulnerable patients, a university
student positive on a pooled screen facing isolation in a bedsit with a
shared bathroom, and a self-employed worker with no clear potential
exposure facing complete loss of income but still needing to pay rent
are in very different situations), so it is challenging to determine the
optimal overall strategy for reducing infection. Selecting and employ-
ing appropriate risk communication strategies, learned from previous
work in screening, will be a key component [43].
Those recommending how to act on results must recognise that
people being asked to take measures harmful to themselves during a
low prevalence phase may eventually exhibit a response similar to
that of the villagers in the story of The Boy Who Cried Wolf, where
the repeated raising of false alarms eventually means there is no
response to a real emergency [44]. If some of those required to isolate
feel well and perceive they pose low risk to others, this may reduce
the likelihood that they will follow public health measures and soreduce the effectiveness of those measures in stopping infection
spreading. Such perceptions may persist into a pandemic phase
where the prevalence of infection is higher, reducing the later effec-
tiveness of responses to waves of infection. The key here is good com-
munication from those leading the public health response. Honest
communication with people that they are being asked to isolate even
though they might be uninfected not only respects their autonomy 
an issue that has arisen in the past with communication within
screening programmes [45]  but also lays the groundwork for the
possibility that they, or people close to them, might later be asked to
isolate again.
A further issue is that the addition of uninfected individuals to
surveillance data may make it harder to trace contacts of infected
individuals, and generates statistical noise (additional variability in
recorded infection rates), making it harder to detect and respond to
increases in infection rates. Even if results arrive too late to impact
other management decisions, confirmatory testing may still be valu-
able, since it may enable us to reduce this noise. To reduce statistical
noise, repeat sampling for nucleic acid amplification testing, or sero-
logical testing, may help, but nucleic acid amplification testing on a
repeat sample may suffer from insensitivity at time of sampling (an
issue that has already been overcome if testing is repeated on the ini-
tial sample), and serological testing for recent infection is a separate
heterogeneous field with its own issues of sensitivity and specificity,
in addition to timing of seroconversion meaning these tests have lim-
ited utility for identifying infectious individuals [10,46]. For these
reasons, repeat nucleic acid amplification testing on the original sam-
ple is most likely to minimise statistical noise.
5. We already have frameworks for thinking about screening
programmes
The development of strategies for managing positive screen
results is the major issue as we move from diagnostic testing for
SARS-CoV-2 to screening, but there are further factors to consider.
Many authors have produced criteria to describe appropriate screen-
ing programmes, perhaps most famously Wilson and Jungner for the
World Health Organization [47]; an example of a modern set of crite-
ria is the set used by the United Kingdom National Screening Com-
mittee (Panel 1). Evaluation of screening for SARS-CoV-2 in
asymptomatic individuals should be considered in light of each of
these, or similar, criteria, and in light of our experiences of screening
programme governance [19,49]. It is particularly instructive to con-
sider how, with regard to these criteria, screening for SARS-CoV-2
differs from screening for other conditions, and what the implications
for a screening programme are in light of these differences.
There are 11 population screening programmes currently
approved in the United Kingdom [50]. Of these, only two relate to
conditions caused by infectious diseases (cervical cancer and infec-
tious diseases in pregnancy). In all current programmes, the popula-
tion at risk is smaller than for SARS-CoV-2 and the pre-symptomatic
stage of the disease (criterion 9) lasts for much longer than the few
days in which maximum benefit can be derived from isolating those
with asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection. This means that in current
programmes much longer screening intervals and times for decisions
on results can be allowed than work for SARS-CoV-2. All current
screening programmes, including those for infectious diseases, are
intended for the direct benefit of those screened or their offspring
(criterion 9), whereas the main benefit of screening for SARS-CoV-2
is to others in a population. All current treatments for SARS-CoV-2
infection are supportive or validated in those with symptoms (i.e.
with COVID-19; criteria 911) [5153], and when a person has
symptoms there is usually time to test for SARS-CoV-2 without sub-
stantially affecting management, so there is little to no benefit to the
person screened in being tested prior to symptom development, and
indeed inconvenience and possibly even harm (criterion 13). The
Panel 1
The condition
1. The condition should be an important health problem as judged by its frequency and/or severity. The epidemiology, incidence, prevalence, and natural history of the condition should be understood, including development from
latent to declared disease and/or there should be robust evidence about the association between the risk or disease marker and serious or treatable disease.
2. All the cost-effective primary prevention interventions should have been implemented as far as possible.
3. If the carriers of a mutation are identified as a result of screening the natural history of people with this status should be understood, including the psychological implications.
The test
4. There should be a simple, safe, precise, and validated screening test.
5. The distribution of test values in the target population should be known and a suitable cut-off level defined and agreed.
6. The test, from sample collection to delivery of results, should be acceptable to the target population.
7. There should be an agreed policy on the further diagnostic investigation of individuals with a positive test result and on the choices available to those individuals.
8. If the test is for a particular mutation or set of genetic variants the method for their selection and the means through which these will be kept under review in the programme should be clearly set out.
The intervention
9. There should be an effective intervention for patients identified through screening, with evidence that intervention at a presymptomatic phase leads to better outcomes for the screened individual compared with usual care.
Evidence relating to wider benefits of screening, for example those relating to family members, should be taken into account where available. However, where there is no prospect of benefit for the individual screened then the
screening programme should not be further considered.
10. There should be agreed evidence based policies covering which individuals should be offered interventions and the appropriate intervention to be offered.
The screening programme
11. There should be evidence from high quality randomised controlled trials that the screening programme is effective in reducing mortality or morbidity. Where screening is aimed solely at providing information to allow the person
being screened to make an “informed choice” (such as Down’s syndrome or cystic fibrosis carrier screening), there must be evidence from high quality trials that the test accurately measures risk. The information that is provided
about the test and its outcome must be of value and readily understood by the individual being screened.
12. There should be evidence that the complete screening programme (test, diagnostic procedures, treatment/intervention) is clinically, socially and ethically acceptable to health professionals and public.
13. The benefit gained by individuals from the screening programme should outweigh any harms, for example from overdiagnosis, overtreatment, false positives, false reassurance, uncertain findings and complications.
14. The opportunity cost of the screening programme (including testing, diagnosis and treatment, administration, training and quality assurance) should be economically balanced in relation to expenditure on medical care as a whole
(value for money). Assessment against this criterion should have regard to evidence from cost benefit and/or cost effectiveness analyses and have regard to the effective use of available resource.
Implementation criteria
15. Clinical management of the condition and patient outcomes should be optimised in all health care providers prior to participation in a screening programme.
16. All other options for managing the condition should have been considered (such as improving treatment or providing other services), to ensure that no more cost effective intervention could be introduced or current interventions
increased within the resources available.
17. There should be a plan for managing and monitoring the screening programme and an agreed set of quality assurance standards.
18. Adequate staffing and facilities for testing, diagnosis, treatment and programme management should be available prior to the commencement of the screening programme.
19. Evidence-based information, explaining the purpose and potential consequences of screening, investigation and preventative intervention or treatment, should be made available to potential participants to assist them in making an
informed choice.
20. Public pressure for widening the eligibility criteria, for reducing the screening interval, and for increasing the sensitivity of the testing process, should be anticipated. Decisions about these parameters should be scientifically
justifiable to the public.
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pandemic status, is likely to justify the cost of case finding (criteria 2,
14, 16), especially given that case finding has the potential to prevent
further cases. Overall, SARS-CoV-2 screening needs to be larger in
scale than other programmes, with faster turnaround from testing to
decisions on management and adequate resolution of discussions on
the potential consequences to individuals and populations from
being screened.
Conclusions
In short, because the best approach to screening depends on situa-
tion  and particularly upon population prevalence of infection, the
sensitivity and specificity of different tests, ability to get results back
quickly enough to make a difference, and different people’s willing-
ness to accept personal inconvenience and harm  there is likely to
be no one-size-fits-all best solution to the question of how to screen.
But this heterogeneity of circumstance should lead to even more care
in optimising screening wherever it is used.
As countries’ capacities for SARS-CoV-2 testing increase, and
screening of asymptomatic individuals becomes feasible, it is highly
desirable to repurpose existing screening oversight organisations, to
leverage their longstanding experience in targeting screening tests to
gain maximum benefit from available capacity. When the number of
cases of COVID-19 declines in a community, it is crucial to update tri-
age guidelines, written for a different pandemic phase, with a differ-
ent understanding of the natural history of infection and infectivity,
and different testing availability, aimed at determining the infection
status of symptomatic individuals. Such guideline updates must spec-
ify triggers for further revision should the community prevalence of
SARS-CoV-2 infection either surge or decline further. As screening
programmes become more established, procedures to evaluate their
effectiveness in target populations should be implemented, and stud-
ies to determine how to increase effectiveness undertaken. As well as
the technical aspects and biomedical consequences of testing, these
studies should aim to understand population engagement with
screening, and social and economic impacts.
The history of screening is already replete with examples where at
best more good could have been done, and at worst unnecessary
harm was caused, because an overenthusiastic belief that more test-
ing is always better led to unwillingness to allow critical appraisal of
programmes. In the middle of a pandemic, we must learn this lesson
from history rapidly.
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